GovCon Bid and Proposal Insights
GovCon Bid and Proposal Insights
Cyberspace Science, Research, Engineering and Technology Integration
Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.
In this episode, we unpack NIWC Pacific’s upcoming Cyberspace Science, Research, Engineering, and Technology Integration opportunity. This Total Small Business IDIQ supports the Navy’s C4ISR and cyberspace operations mission, with work spanning systems engineering, software, and cybersecurity. With a Q2 2026 RFP and four anticipated awards, early awareness is critical. Thinking about positioning early?
Listen now to understand the scope and what small businesses should prepare for next.
Contact ProposalHelper at sales@proposalhelper.com to find similar opportunities and help you build a realistic and winning pipeline.
Let's get right into it. Usually when we pull a government document for a deep dive, you know, we have to dig through layers of fluff to find the nugget of gold. But today, today, we are looking at a document that is, well, it's effectively a blueprint for the next generation of warfare. Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_01:It really is. On the surface, it looks like uh just standard bureaucratic paperwork. It's a statement of work or SOW for the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific.
SPEAKER_00:NIWC Pacific.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly. NIWC Pacific. And technically it's a draft for a small business multiple award contract dated just a few days ago, February 3rd, 2026. But if you actually read the requirements, I mean if you look at what they are asking these contractors to do, it is this fascinating comprehensive window into how the U.S. military defines the battlefield today.
SPEAKER_00:Exactly. The title is Cyberspace Science, Research, Engineering, and Technology Integration, which, you know, sounds friendly enough, maybe a little dry.
SPEAKER_01:A little dry, yeah.
SPEAKER_00:But then you get into the definitions. We aren't just talking about fixing printers or uh setting up firewalls here. This is an IT support.
SPEAKER_01:Far from it. The core mission here is to find industry partners who can handle what they call full spectrum cyberspace operations.
SPEAKER_00:Full spectrum.
SPEAKER_01:And that phrase full spectrum does a lot of heavy lifting. The document explicitly states that the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through the cyberspace domain.
SPEAKER_00:Okay, so not just protecting it, but using it.
SPEAKER_01:Using it.
SPEAKER_00:Okay.
SPEAKER_01:And they are looking for support to assure superiority for the warfighter.
SPEAKER_00:Aaron Powell Assure superiority. I mean, that sets a very different tone than, say, maintain the network.
SPEAKER_01:Totally different.
SPEAKER_00:And here is where it gets really interesting for me. When I think of cyberspace, I think of the internet. I think of servers, fiber optic cables, maybe Wi-Fi routers. But this document has a definition of cyberspace that completely blew my mind.
SPEAKER_01:It really broadens the definition way beyond the uh the civilian understanding. The document quotes the Secretary of Defense, defining it as an interdependent network of information technology infrastructures. Okay, that's the standard part, the hardware. But later on, when they describe the actual operations, they explicitly link that infrastructure to, and I'm quoting the text here, the interaction between the physical, social, and biological networks. Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_00:Biological networks. That's what stopped me in my tracks. They aren't just talking about hacking a laptop, they are talking about the intersection of code, people, and well, biology.
SPEAKER_01:It paints this picture of a domain that isn't virtual anymore. It's completely woven into reality. It suggests that the network doesn't stop at the screen, it extends into the user.
SPEAKER_00:Wow.
SPEAKER_01:And the mission of this deep dive is to explore that convergence. We're going to look at how this document breaks down the three pillars of cyber war, the incredible technology stack they are asking for. Things like quantum computing and AI, and this really provocative idea of the human network as part of the battlefield.
SPEAKER_00:So let's dive into those pillars. The document categorizes the work into three main buckets OCO, DCO, and DODI. And honestly, the first one, OCO, it sounds like the plot of a techno thriller.
SPEAKER_01:OCO stands for offensive cyberspace operations. And again, the language the SOW uses here is very, very direct. It says OCO is intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace.
SPEAKER_00:Application of force. We don't usually talk about software in those terms. I mean, force is usually kinetic bullets, missiles.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly. But in this context, they are codifying software as a weapon system. And it gets specific. It includes operations to attack automated systems. They list C4 ISR, which is command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
SPEAKER_00:Aaron Powell So the nervous system of an opposing military force.
SPEAKER_01:Aaron Ross Powell Basically, yeah. Their entire nervous system. And it goes back to that concept we touched on earlier. It says OTO involves the interaction between physical, social, and biological networks that define human-machine interaction.
SPEAKER_00:Okay, let's break that down.
SPEAKER_01:Aaron Powell That is the key differentiator. So an offensive operation isn't just shutting down a power grid or, you know, breaking a server. It's exploiting how a human interacts with a machine. If you can manipulate the data on a radar screen or alter the timing of a communication relay, you are effectively manipulating the human operator.
SPEAKER_00:Aaron Powell You're hacking the pilot, not just the plane.
SPEAKER_01:Precisely. And the document lists a specific requirement for offensive tool development. They need contractors to create and refine capabilities to exploit adversary systems.
SPEAKER_00:So they need a digital arsenal.
SPEAKER_01:They need a stockpile of exploits, a digital armory.
SPEAKER_00:Okay, so that's the sword. Then you have the shield, which is DCO or defensive cyberspace operations. But reading this, it didn't feel like they were just asking for someone to install antivirus software and call it a day.
SPEAKER_01:No, DCO in this context is much more dynamic. The document describes it as both active and passive defense. Passive is your standard firewall, you know, the castle wall. But active defense is hunting. It's operating inside your own networks to find intruders who have already bypassed the perimeter.
SPEAKER_00:The ones already inside the gates.
SPEAKER_01:Right. And the standout requirement for me in this section was cyber deception. I circled that three times. Cyberdeception for defense.
SPEAKER_00:It's a fascinating concept. The SOW calls for using deception techniques on both physical hardware and software environments, and the goal is to confuse and mislead adversaries while enhancing detection.
SPEAKER_01:So you aren't just blocking the intruder, you're creating a hall of mirrors for them.
SPEAKER_00:Exactly. Imagine a hacker breaches the outer wall. Instead of finding the real database, they find a decoy, a honeypot. It looks real, it acts real, but it's a trap. It wastes their time, it burns their resources, and most importantly, it reveals their tactics to you while they think they are being stealthy.
SPEAKER_01:It's psychological warfare against the hacker. You make them doubt what is real and what isn't.
SPEAKER_00:You raise the cost of their attack, and that leads us to the third pillar, which is really the foundation of it all Doden operations.
SPEAKER_01:Doden, that's the Department of Defense Information Network. Correct. This felt like the sustainment piece, the nuts and bolts of it all. It is, but you can't underestimate it. This is about designing, building, and securing the communication systems themselves. The document emphasizes data availability, integrity, and confidentiality. But there's another key term here, non-repudiation.
SPEAKER_00:Nonrepudiation? Wow, that's a mouthful. That means proving someone did something, right? You can't deny it.
SPEAKER_01:Correct. In a civilian context, non-repudiation is for things like digital signatures on a contract. But in a military context, it is absolutely vital for the chain of command. If an order is sent to launch a kinetic strike or to move a carrier group, the system must be able to prove mathematically and undeniably who sent that command.
SPEAKER_00:You can't have someone say, I didn't order that in a war zone.
SPEAKER_01:And you definitely can't have an adversary spoofing an order from a general. So dread and operations ensure the network is survivable and that the data on it can be trusted implicitly. It's the bedrock that OCO and DCO stand on.
SPEAKER_00:So we have the offense, the defense, and the network itself. But then the document takes a turn into what they call the convergence. And this is where we start seeing things like electromagnetic maneuver warfare.
SPEAKER_01:EMW. This is huge for the Navy specifically. The document notes that cyber operations often flow through the electromagnetic spectrum. Radio waves, optical environments, millimeter waves, all of it.
SPEAKER_00:Right, because if you're on a ship in the middle of the Pacific, you aren't plugging an Ethernet cable into the wall, you're beaming data.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly. The airwaves are the network. And the SOW defines the goal of EMW as commanding the electromagnetic spectrum as a critical maneuver space. It says the objective is to create a combat advantage by disrupting the adversary's kill chain while optimizing our own.
SPEAKER_00:That phrase kill chain is so evocative. It sounds like something out of a movie, but it's a very specific military concept, isn't it?
SPEAKER_01:It is. The kill chain is the sequence of events an enemy has to go through to launch an attack successfully. They have to find you, fix your location, track you, target you, engage you, and then assess the damage. FTT2EA.
SPEAKER_00:F2T2EA, got it. And this document is saying we are going to use the radio spectrum itself to break that chain.
SPEAKER_01:It effectively treats the airwaves as physical terrain that has to be held and controlled. If I can jam your radar, you can't find me.
SPEAKER_00:Chain robot.
SPEAKER_01:If I can spoof your targeting data via a cyber injection into your comms, you can't target me.
SPEAKER_00:Chain broken again.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly.
SPEAKER_00:It's fascinating. But what I found even more compelling was how they connected this back to the human element. We mentioned biological networks earlier, but the text explicitly links cyber ops to influencing decision making.
SPEAKER_01:Yeah, this is the part that felt very sci-fi to me, but it's becoming standard doctrine. They want contractors who understand aspects of human behavior and cognitive functions.
SPEAKER_00:To what end? I mean, why does a network engineer need to understand cognitive science?
SPEAKER_01:The document tells us why. It's to influence adversary decision making.
SPEAKER_00:Yeah.
SPEAKER_01:It references MISO military information support operations and MILDEC military deception.
SPEAKER_00:So wait, we aren't just hacking the computer to stop the missile launch. We are hacking the information environment to change the mind of the guy whose finger is on the button.
SPEAKER_01:Or to make him doubt the data he's seeing on his screen. The document speaks to the convergence of physical, biological, and social networks and how that affects human interactions and decision cycles.
SPEAKER_00:It's the OD loop all over again. Observe, orient, decide, act.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly right. If you can control the information a human receives via their screens, their headsets, their data feeds, you're effectively hacking the human's orient phase. And if their orientation is based on false data, their decision will be wrong.
SPEAKER_00:It really blurs the line. You have the computer network and the human network, and this SOW treats them as one continuous system.
SPEAKER_01:That is the modern battlefield. It's holistic. And to operate in that environment, you need an incredible technology stack. The list of requirements in uh section 2.2 and 2.7 is essentially a laundry list of the most advanced tech on the planet.
SPEAKER_00:Oh, absolutely. I saw machine learning, artificial intelligence, quantum computing. I mean, it's all there.
SPEAKER_01:And notice how they want that software built. They specify DevSecOps.
SPEAKER_00:DevSecOps. That's development, security, and operations, right? For the non-coders listening, what does that actually imply?
SPEAKER_01:Well, in the old days, the waterfall days, you'd write code for a year, and then the security guys would come in at the end and check it. DevSecOps means integrating cybersecurity into every single phase of the development lifecycle. The SOW says this is to ensure a continuous security posture. You can't afford to build a weapon system and then patch it later. It has to be secure from line one of the code.
SPEAKER_00:And speaking of code, there was a requirement for reverse engineering that stood out to me.
SPEAKER_01:Yes. They require the ability to reverse engineer software components to find vulnerabilities when source code isn't available.
SPEAKER_00:Which implies they are looking at software that maybe wasn't built by friendly forces.
SPEAKER_01:Or software that is closed source. Or, you know, maybe adversary malware that has been captured. If you catch a digital weapon in the wild, you need to be able to take it apart, figure out how it works, and either fix the hole it exploited, or, or in the case of OCO, find a hole in their tool to use against them.
SPEAKER_00:Wow. There's also a section on modeling and simulation. And the description there was almost poetic. They want to create simulations of a future environment where sensors and networks are ubiquitous and transparent to humans.
SPEAKER_01:Transparent to humans, that's the key phrase. The technology should be everywhere, but the user shouldn't have to think about it. It just works. They want to war game in that environment. They want to simulate the future environment to see how their tactics hold up when everything is connected to everything else.
SPEAKER_00:It's so ambitious. But let's talk about the logistics of this. Because reading through the security requirements, you realize this isn't a work from home in your pajamas kind of gig. This is serious operational support.
SPEAKER_01:Definitely not. The scale of operation described here is global and highly classified. The SOW mentions requirements for foreign travel, specifically citing UCOM. That's European command.
SPEAKER_00:And they talk about anti-terrorism briefings and even personal protection plans for travelers. This is real-world stuff.
SPEAKER_01:It creates a real sense of gravity. And just look at the clearance levels. The work ranges from unclassified all the way up to top secret SCI.
SPEAKER_00:SCI, sensitive compartmented information.
SPEAKER_01:That's right. They mention access to JWICS and NSANet. I mean, those are the big leaguers.
SPEAKER_00:They really are.
SPEAKER_01:JWICS is the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. That's where the classified video feeds live. NSANet is the National Security Agency's internal network. To get that access, the personnel requirements are rigorous. The document mentions continuous vetting.
SPEAKER_00:Continuous vetting, so it's not just a one-time background check.
SPEAKER_01:No. It implies they are constantly monitoring your eligibility, financials, legal issues, foreign contacts, everything. And it implies the need for polygraphs because it references tier five background investigations for privileged access. You're essentially opening your entire life to the government to work on these contracts.
SPEAKER_00:And it's not just about keeping state secrets, it's about OPSIC operations security. I thought the definition of OPSC in the document was really insightful. It's not just about hiding classified info.
SPEAKER_01:Aaron Powell No, and that's a common misconception. The SOW defines OPSE as a continuous analytical process. It focuses on protecting critical information. And they specify that this includes unclassified facts.
SPEAKER_00:Right. Facts that, if an adversary knew them, could guarantee failure of the mission.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly. Think about it like a puzzle. If I know that a specific contractor, Team One, that specializes in offensive cyber tools, just booked 10 plane tickets to a specific base in Germany.
SPEAKER_00:And they ordered a specific type of server rack.
SPEAKER_01:I could put those unclassified pieces together and realize, oh, the U.S. is setting up a cyber offensive capability in the European theater. The travel wasn't secret, the server wasn't secret, but the combination reveals the intent. So the contractor has to be just as disciplined with their unclassified logistics as they are with the top secret code.
SPEAKER_00:It really highlights that information is the weapon, whether it's code or a travel itinerary or a radio wave, it's all part of the same fight.
SPEAKER_01:That's the synthesis we talked about at the beginning. This document creates a single operational domain that integrates hardware, software, the electromagnetic spectrum, human psychology, and yes, biological networks.
SPEAKER_00:It's overwhelming when you see it all laid out like that. It feels like the definition of war is expanding in every direction simultaneously.
SPEAKER_01:It is. But from the perspective of NIWC Pacific, it's necessary. The goal, as stated right there in the text, is mission assurance. They aren't just trying to keep the computers running, they're trying to assure superiority for the warfighter. In a world where the enemy is using all those same domains, you have to be dominant in all of them all at the same time.
SPEAKER_00:So bringing this all home, what is the big takeaway for the listener? We've looked at the offensive tool, the defensive deception, the cognitive warfare. What does this document tell us about the state of the world?
SPEAKER_01:Aaron Powell I think it fundamentally changes how we should view the concept of warfare. We tend to think of kinetic warfare tanks, planes, missiles, and then we think of cyber as this separate nerdy thing happening in a server room somewhere in a basement.
SPEAKER_00:Right. The hacker in a hoodie trope.
SPEAKER_01:Exactly. This document just obliterates that distinction. Cyber isn't separate. Cyber is the spectrum that the tanks communicate on. Cyber is the decision the pilot's brain makes. Cyber is the biological network. It suggests that there is no rear echelon anymore. The network is everywhere, so the battlefield is everywhere.
SPEAKER_00:It makes you wonder if the definition of cyberspace operations now includes biological networks and influencing human cognition, where does the computer network end and the human network begin?
SPEAKER_01:That is the question. And looking at this SOW, I think the military's answer is there is no line anymore. It's all one network.
SPEAKER_00:A sobering thought to end on. That's our deep dive for today. Thanks for listening.
SPEAKER_01:Thank you.